-2 -smooth flow.
Presumably the man who is happy is never taken aback, never has to recast his priorities. He is above all consistentf his intentions and motives can be viewed as forming a coherent whole . There is no absolute decree, you ought to behave consistently, virtuously, etc.
According to
Rather there is the proposition that whoever is happy will, as a matter of fact, be consistent, virtuous, etc. But to say with the Stoic that virtue entails happiness is not to say that the only reason -or indeed a necessary reason -for being virtuous is because it entails happiness. It seems that both happiness and virtue may in some sense be sought for their own sake.
In fact it seems that the Stoics were prepared to say two things :
1) It will in fact pay to be virtuous provided that you want to be happy; and 2) the good man will seek virtue for its own sake.
Some of the apparent difficulties ::'. \). reconciling these propositions may be resolved by examining the notion of seeking virtue for its own sake.
What then do the Stoics say that virtue is?
We are not short of definitions, although no definition is associated with Zeno alone. Normally virtue appears either as a "con sistent disposition" ll or more generally as some kind of condition of the ruling part of the soul ( �y�pov1Kbv with Nature" should involve us with the grounds of ethics, or metaethics.
Looking at this in another way, we might say that any questions about the end to which the answer "self-consistency" could be meaningfully
given entail a further question about the kind of consistency requiredto which the answer "consistency with Nature" might be given. We start off with the assumption that happiness is in some sense the goal.
We are faced with trying to determine how such a goal may become a realityo 'What would be the natural way of looking at such a problem?
In the first instance everyone would tend to look at it as a strictly ethical problem. And anyone thinking philosophically at the time when The conclusion of a.11 this must be that if Zeno did not speak precisely both of 11living consistently" and "living consistently with nature", he must have described his ethical end in two different ways to which these different phrases could be properly applied -and there fore that since Diogenes Laertius attributes the second phrase to him there is no good reason to reject it.
The only other question which should be treated briefly here is what it might mean for us to develop, to pass from infancy to man hood, while still living consistently with our first natural impulses.
It is clear that from the time of Chrysippus the Stoics were in the habit of talking about different oikeioseis1 from the oikeiosis to oneself at birth, there develop oikeioseis with different conditions in later life. As Kerferd puts it, "an organism seeks to preserve the constitution in which it is at the moment11 In part because by separating the goal (happiness) from the end (virtue) he underestimated the importance of eudaemonism in preaching a moral system to the un converted.
Or if he did not underestimate it, he kept implying that he did a�d that one should.
